Here
I am, still held captive as a prisoner by the State of Texas. Here still, am I
posting blogs and Facebook Information by proxy, thanks to my friends and
relatives who are gracious enough to do so on my behalf.
For
a while now, I haven’t been so active regarding ‘posts’ because I have
concentrated on several court filings instead. Some of that is concluding, so
my focus will shift a little.
In
a direct sense, I haven’t been true to codifying what ALI3NIZM is, in part
because of the court issues; and human nature being predictable, I focused on
legal filings because my liberty is at stake and any relief could mean release
from captivity. Otherwise, I am here until 2017. So it remains for m to connect
what I’m doing to ALI3NIZM proper, which I will do post haste.
To
that end, I’d like to say that, as referenced in the manuscript ‘ALI3NIZM”; we
ali3nz are ________. The dictionary definition of that is: “People who are
alienated from mainstream society.” And who might be more alienated from
society than people in prisons. But, we may not be the only ones alienated. In
so far as that definition requires a nexus to ali3nz, we will start with one of
six problem points I have personally noted regarding society in the United
States. The same may apply more or less in other nations. All the points will
be addressed in time. For this discussion it is enough to express that all six
points are related to economic issues and hardly anyone could argue that each
of us are not affected by “The Economy.”
My
discourse begins with Point #2: ‘EQUAL DEBT UNEQUAL BENEFIT.” This point stems
from my own observance of reports within the media where too often everything
that happens is equated with a financial value. Often is seen reports of
hurricanes, floods, or earthquakes that cost many millions of dollars in
estimated damage. This is logically important to the society at large because
ALL of us will end up bearing the cost in the end, whether through higher
insurance premiums, taxes, or just a higher outright cost for products. Deaths
from such a disaster are usually noted as a sidebar in the reports in my
opinion, versus the financial data. I do not think death and injury should be
downplayed through a reductive reference to a dollar value. That minimizes people
Ali3nz are people, and we do not want to be minimized.
Other
mass media reports suggest the ‘NATIONAL DEBT’ (not to be confused with the
Federal Deficit) is all over the map in terms of the amounts owed by the United
States to its creditors. I have seen from 15 trillion to over 100 trillion
dollars of owned debt listed. Who knows how much it really is, and will they
say it out loud?
Another
interesting fact is that however much the national debt is said to
be—economists and media generally refer to the “per capita” amount of debt owed
in dollars. In other words, the total debt is divided into the population of
305 to 307-ish million souls in America to arrive at a sum ‘owed’ per each man,
woman, or child living today. This suggests that each of us may actually owe an
equal portion of the debt. Could this be possible? If half of Americans
were beamed up to an alien ship leaving the other half behind, would the left
behind half be obligated to ‘pay’ off the debt to the creditors? Food for
thought.
Whatever
amount is calculated, it bring to mind a question: “If I want to pay-off my
portion of the national debt, how much would it be?”
Perhaps
another, more troubling question would arise: “Is every child born today
saddles with ‘x-amount’ of national debt attached to him or her?
Indeed, I have contemplated this
from the standpoint of the equal debt unequal benefit issue. Some say each
American owes those creditors over $300,000. Another problem is that most
Americans (ali3nz or not) each much less than that amount per year. It might
take most of us a lifetime to just break even. That does not leave much wiggle
room to plan for a profit or even a form of comfort.
The question I ask in relation to
all this is, “Where’s the equal benefit?” That is to say, if I owe $300,000 (or
any amount) of my so-called part of national debt, then where is my
$300,000 worth of benefits? Whatever the ‘equally divided’ amount turns
out to be, every human living in America today experiences differently, the
benefits or use of what society offers (or perhaps unequally). Do you think President
Barack Obama has greater or lesser use of available benefits than the cafeteria
worker at a local elementary school?
Not everyone benefits equally
Other examples include the various trials or legal problems involving O.J.
Simpson, Michael Jackson, Martha Stewart, and Lindsay Lohan. Given similar
circumstances but deleting the wealth and fame, it is safe to say that average
people, i.e. not rich or famous, would likely suffer the brunt of similar
actions very near to the fullest extent of the law. Ali3nz are people who may
be held to an equal debt, but are prevented from experiencing the full use of
society’s offered benefits.
Discounting the possible reasons
for the city dichotomy, it should be noted (by the celebrity reference above),
that the debt vs. benefit issue can manifest in other venues besides the
financial one. In an effort to illustrate this idea, I have attached a report
of my investigation so far, into the issue as it concerns prison ali3nz
attempting to obtain Redress of Grievances via the court system. After all,
that IS one of the benefits we are all supposed to reap E Q U A L L Y !
May of the people held in
America’s prisons have taken it upon themselves to explore the legal system
through their respective ‘prison law libraries.’ Some of us ali3nz will become
discouraged at the complexities of the system and do nothing further, while
others will perform what I like to call conventional filings. That is usually
an attack on their conviction (by direct appeal or a Habeas Corpus), or perhaps
a civil suit concerning prison conditions [Civil Rights violation, 42 USC 1983].
As for me, I have done those ‘conventional’ things and have come to the
conclusion that there are inherent problems in the legal system which precludes
an ali3n like myself, from obtaining a remedy through those regular avenues. It
appears “Something is rotten in Denmark,” or at least in Texas, so I am
thinking outside the box. Or maybe there is no box, but I have recently tried
out-of-the-box approaches by filing Civil Suite #2;13CV230 and Habeas Corpus
Petition #2;13CV217 in Federal District Court in Amarillo. Both were dismissed
and the judge failed to even respond to my constitutional questions. I mean, if
I am wrong, tell me I am wrong and show me the authority for the decision. But
answer my questions. To remain silent tells me you are being deceptive for a
reason.
My reasoning for combining out of
the box issues with conventional approaches, lies in research, I order to
discover the nature of the legal system as t is attached to the rest of the
system of debt. A daunting task when the powers that be refuse to address
pointed questions.
Before you begin to examine my
logic below, here’s a disclaimer: Some of the authorities cited herein come
directly from what I call “Sovereign Literature” (though I doubt the term
literature could properly be used), aka Sovereignty or Redemption. I do not
consider myself one of “those people,” but have vetted their reasoning and authorities
to the extent I am capable from prison, and there is a line of probability
there. To the extent my interpretation of the sovereign literature may be
correct, I am asking officials to accept the points. To the extent my logic may
be skewed by the literature as ‘bogus’ as suggested by the mainstreamers, I
intend to discover that as well. I will report and expose another view.
To explain my understanding of
sovereignty or redemption, insofar as it may apply to the remedies we seek, I
think it is bet to let the established authorities speak on my behalf. I will
connect the dots in between with my own reasoning based, hopefully on formal
and informal logic; leaving you to form a conclusion. We’ll begin with a
definition of the word SOVEREIGNTY:
1.
BOUVIER’S
LAW DICTIONARY, 14TH Ed. Defines “sovereignty” thusly; “It has been
justly thought a matter of importance to determine from what source the United
States derives its authority…The question here proposed is whether our bond of
union is a compact entered into law established by the people. To this we can
answer: W THE PEOPLE…ordain and establish this Constitution…The government of
the state has only delegated power from the people, even if they had no
authority to transfer the authority of the sovereign people. The people in
their sovereign capacity made and adopted the constitution; and it binds the
state governments without the state’s consent. The United States, as a whole,
therefore, emanates from the people and not from the states, and the constitution
and the laws of the states, whether made before or since the adoption of that constitution
of the United States, are subordinate to the United States Constitution and the
laws made in pursuance of it. The people are the fountain of sovereignty. The whole
was originally with them as their own. The state governments are but trustees
acting under a derived authority, and had no power to delegate what is not
delegated to them. But the people, the original fountain, might take away what
they have lend out in trust to whom they please. They have the whole title, and
as absolute proprietors have the right of using or abusing—jus utendi et
abutendi. It is a maxim consecrated in public law as well as common sense and
the necessity of the case that a sovereign is answerable for his acts only to
his GOD and his conscience…there is no authority above a sovereign to which an
appeal can be made.” 4 Wheat. 402.
2.
“At
the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the
sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subject…and have
none to govern but themselves; the Citizens of America are equal as fellow
Citizens, and a joint tenants in the sovereignty.” CHISHOLM VS. EORGIA, 2
U.S. 419, 2 DALL. 419 (1793).
3.
“For
when the revolution took place the people of each state became themselves
sovereign.” MARTIN, ET AL VS. THE LESSEE OF WADDELL, 41 US. (16 PET.)
367,410.
Does
it not appear that after the American Revolution, the people—whether collective
or individual, replaced King George of England as “SOVEREIGN(S)”? For those who
might suggest that the above authority is old or inaccurate, etc., there is
more…
4.
“Under
our system the people who were in England called subjects are here the
sovereign…Their rights, whether collective or individual, are not bound to give
way to a sentiment of loyalty to the person of a monarch. The Citizen here
knows no person, however, in years to those in power, or however powerful
himself to whom he need yield the rights which the law secures to him…” UNITED
STATES VS. LEE, 106 U.S. 196,208.
5.
“People
of a state are entitled to all rights which formerly belonged to the king by
his prerogative.” LANSING VS. SMITH, 4 WEND. 9,20 (1829).
6.
“It
is true that at [English] Common Law the duty of the attorney general was to represent
the king, he being the embodiment of the state. But under the democratic form
of government now prevailing the people [are] king, so the attorney general’s
duties are to that sovereign rather than the machinery of government.” HANCOCK
VS. CARRY ALCORN MINING CO. INC., KY 503 S. 2d 710.
7.
“In
Europe, the executive is synonymous with the sovereign power of the state…where
it is too commonly acquired by force or fraud, or both…In America, however, the
case is widely different. Our government is founded upon compact. Sovereignty
was, and is, in the people.” GLASS VS. THE SLOOP BETSY, 3 DALL. 6.
8.
“Sovereignty
itself is, of course, not subject to aw for it is the author and source of
law.” But in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies
of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom
all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of
power.” YICK WO AND WOO LEE VS. HOPKINS, 118 U.S. 356.
***I don’t know about you, but I have many questions
about how the government came to apply its delegated sovereign powers OVER the
actual sovereigns. Is that even lawful??
9.
“In
our country the people are sovereign…and the government cannot sever its
relationship to the people.” AFROYIM VS. RUSK, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
10.
“All
government does and provides legitimately is in pursuit of its duty to provide
protection for private rights.” (WYNHAMMER VS. PEOPLE, 13 N.Y. 378),
which duty is a debt owed to its creator, WE THE PEOPLE, and the private disenfranchised
individual; which debt and duty is never extinguished nor discharged and is
perpetual. No matter what government/state provides for us in manner of
convenience and safety, the disenfranchised individual owes nothing to the
government.” “The individual may stand upon his Constitutional rights as a
Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His
power to contract is unlimited. He owes not duty to the state or to his
neighbors to divulge his business or to open his doors to investigation…He owes
no duty to the state since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection
of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the
land, long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can
only be taken from him by Due Process of the law and in accordance with the
Constitution. He owes nothing to the public as long as h does not trespass upon
their rights.” HALE VS. HENKLE, 201 U.S. 43, AT 74 (1908).
***It appears the people of America are Sovereign
and ranking above the government they created. Today we find that the
government places itself over the people by its domineering treatment of us.
How can this be? Did we somehow sign up for this? Do we somehow owe the
government a debt that places us under it?
11.
“We
The People have discharged any debt which may be said to exist or be owed to
the state or government. The governments are, however, indebted continually to
the people, because the people created the government corporation and because
we suffer its continued existence. The continued debt owed to the people is
discharged only as it continues not to violate our private rights, and when
government fails in its duty to provide protection—discharge its debt to the
people—it is an abandonment of any and all power, authority or vestige of
‘sovereignty’ which it possessed, and the laws remain the same, the sovereignty
reverting to the people whence it came.” DOWN VS. BIDWELL, 182 U.S. 277.
12.
“There
is no such thing as a power if inherent sovereignty in the government of the
United States. In this country sovereignty resides in the people and congress
can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution entrusted to
it: all else is withheld.” JULLIARD VS. GREENMAN, 110 U.S. 421.
13.
“…The
congress cannot revoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will
as thus declared.” PERRY VS. UNITE STATES, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).
14.
“Where
rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rulemaking of
legislation which would abrogate them.” MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA
***Neither do we see sovereigns like myself “named”
in statutes, but we do see the term “person” invoked in almost every code,
rule, or regulation. In light of the authorities above, it does not appear the
legislature has direct authority nor any of the sovereign people living in
America since the revolution. This being the case, it is necessary to determine
the nature of the word ‘person’ and whether it has been used against me in a
lawful way. Here are some authorities which address the term in reference to a
‘sovereign’…
15.
“In
common usage, the term person does not include the sovereign, and
statutes not employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.” UNITED
STATES VS. UNITED MINE WORKERS, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
16.
“Since
in common usage, the term person does not include a sovereign, statutes not
employing the phrases are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” UNITED STATES
VS. FOX, 94 U.S. 315; 1 U.S.C. 1, n. 12.
17.
“The
Sovereign cannot be named in any statue as merely a ‘person,’ or ‘any
person.’ WILLS VS. MICHIGAN STATE POLICE, 105 L.Ed. 45 (1989).
***Neither do we see soveriegns like myself ‘named’
in statues, but we do see the term “person” invoked in almost every
code, rule, or regulation. Insofar as the government has lied to me, it is
necessary to determine the nature of the word “person” and whether it
has been used against me (or you) in a lawful way. Here are what some
authorities say about the term person:
18.
We
will begin with an old Latin legal maxim; “Homo Vocbulum Et Naturae; Persona
Juris Civilis” when translated means: “Man is a term of Nature; Person
is a term of Civil Law.”
***This legal maxim is helpful in that it indicates
the term ‘person may not designate a man, woman, or child. This idea is
supported in the following court cases:
19.
“To
properly construe the word ‘person’ we must look to statutes containing it in
para material [meaning “on like subject matter”]. KUCHER V. PIERCE CO., 600
P2d 683 (Wa. 1979).
20.
“The
word ‘person’ in legal terminology is perceived as a ‘general word’
which includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings.”
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY V. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 612 F.2d 417, 425 (1979).
21.
I
may be jumping ahead here, but I think it is pertinent now to define the term
‘person’ as stated within the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC): “ ‘Person’
means, ‘Individual, Corporation, Business, Trust, Estate, Trust, Partnership,
LLC, Association, Joint Venture, Government, Government subdivision, Agency,
Instrumentality, Public Corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.”
UCC 1.201(27).
***I know what you are thinking. You’re thinking the
first word in that definition is individual, which is a human, right? So, it
appears the definition of ‘person’ while maintaining that said entities are
“legal or commercial” may also suggest human individuals. Looking again at the
Scientology case, supra para. 20; the court rules person was a ‘general word’
which manifests in two rules of statutory construction; NOSCITUR A SOCIIS,
(Lat. “It is known by its associates”), and EJUSDEM GENERIS (Lat. “Of the same
class”).
Being a general word, the term ‘person’
can be limited by the statutory rule of NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, which teaches that
the meaning of a word in a statute may be determined by reference to its
association with other words or phrases. See: 2 A.C. Sands, Sutherlands
Statues and Statutory Construction, Subsection 47.16 (4th Ed.
1973); cf. LENHOFF V. BIRCH BAY REAL ESTATE, INC., 587 p 2D 1087 (Wa.
1978).
In light of the context [UCC 1.201], the
word ‘person should be interpreted to mean “corporation or company.” See:
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM Property, Section 10; 63 American Jurisprudence 2d,
Property, Section 2; especially since all the other words in that paragraph
suggest corporate entities. Even the term ‘individual’ can mean a single
corporation or business or “corporation sole.” When in doubt look at the final
phrase, “…or any other legal or commercial entity.” The term ‘any other’
implies that EVERY word already used in the paragraph indicates a legal or
commercial entity.
In addition, the meaning of doubtful words
may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated
words. See: SHURGARD V. STATE, Wa. APP. 1985) 700 P.2d 1176; CITY OF
MERCER ISLAND V. KALTENBUH, 371 p.2D 1009 (Wa. 1962); 2A N. Singer,
Statutory Construction, Subsection 47.16 (4th Ed. 1984).
***If you aren’t quite convinced, the
‘EJUSDEM GENERIS’ rule requires that general terms appearing in a statute in
connection with specific terms are to be given meaning and effect to the extent
that the general terms suggest items similar to those designated by the
specific terms. In short, specific terms such as: corporation, trust, commercial
entity, etc.; modify or restrict the application of general terms (such as:
person), where both are used in sequence. KING COUNTY WATER DIST. 68 V. TAX
COMM., 58 Wa.2d 282, 244 (1951).
22.
Under
the rule EJUSDEM GENERIS, specific words modify and restrict interpretation of
general words. DEAN VS. MCFARLAND, 500 P.2d 1244 (Wa. 1972).
23.
A
general term (such as person) applied to the ejusdem generis rule of statutory
construction is to be construed in its widest extent wherein it follows an
enumeration of things by words of a particular and specific kind See: GOLDSMITH
VS. U.S., 42 F.2d 133, 137.
And again for
reference: “The people or the sovereign are not bound by general words in
statutes, restrictive of prerogative right, title, or interest, unless expressly
named…” THE PEOPLE VS. HERKIMER, 15 AMERIAN DECISIONS 379, 4 COWEN (NY 345,
348) 1825.
24.
See
Paragraph 19, and on “like subject matter;” the term PERSON is a corporate
entity and corporations are created by the state. See: COLONIAL PIPELINE VS.
TRIGLE, 95 S.Ct. 1538 (1975). Other entities created by the state are:
ARTIFICIAL PERSON: In a figurative sense, a body of
men or company are sometimes called an artificial person, because the law
associates them as one, and gives them various powers possessed by natural
persons. Corporations are such artificial persons. (BOUVIER’S LAW Dict. 6th
Ed. 1856).
STRAWMAN: A ‘front,’ a third party who is put up in
name only to take part in a transaction
in name only. Nominal party in a transaction. (BLACK’s LAW Dict. 6th
Ed.). The term is also used in commercial and property contexts when a transfer
is made to a third party, the strawman, simply for the purpose of
retransferring to the transferor in order to accomplish some other purpose not
otherwise permitted. (BARRON’s Dict. of LEGAL TERMS 3rd Ed.).
STRAMENUS HOMO: Lat. “false mask” Hist. A fictional
person such as a corporation.
RES: Lat. A thing/ (BARRON’s Dict. of Legal Terms, 3rd
Ed.).
DUMMY CORPORATION: An artificial person or legal
entity create by or under the authority of the laws of a state or nation,
composed, in some rare instances of a single person. (BLACK’s Law Dict, 6th
Ed.). “The corporation is distinct from the individual or individuals who
comprise it.” Such entity subsists as a body politic under a special
denomination, which is regarded in law as having a personality and distinct
from that of its several members. See: DARTMOUNT COLLEGE VS. WOODWARD, 4
WHEAT. 518,636; U.S. VS. TRINIDAD COAL CO., 137 U.S. 160, 11 S.Ct. 57. In
rare instances where it lists a single person, this would be considered a
corporation sole, which consists only of that one person only in some
particular situation, who is incorporated by law in order to give them some
legal capacities, which in their natural persons they could not have. See: STEPH.
COMM., 168,167; REID VS. BARRY, 112 S.O. 846,859.
***Considering all the above, it is so hard to
believe the term PERSON could be
synonymous with offender, inmate, petitioner, taxpayer, resident, employee,
vessel, citizen, and the like? Is it so difficult to believe that the state
could have charged a strawman in order to cause a human to become liable to a
penal judgement, with without the human’s foreknowledge? A person is certainly not
a sovereign!
25.
OFFENDER
is a person who has committed a crime. BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY, 9th
Ed.
26.
INMATE
is a person imprisoned. TEXAS GOVT. CODE, Section 498.
***
Note that both terms mentioned in Paras. 25 and 26 are used interchangeably in
agency matters. Notice also that the terms ‘offender’ and ‘inmate’ relate
directly to the base term, ‘person.’ To the extent that the term person as used
in codes, regulations, and the like, the same represents a state created
commercial entity that only exists on paper, and the sovereign man or woman IS
NOT a PERSON; then it appears that the 3 terms above cannot be applied to
humans, except in certain limited circumstances. In other words, there must be
some other binding connection involved.
27.
In
his book, “THE COMMON LAW,” former Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes
indicates a thing or Res [Lat. “a thing”] can cause injury; the thing
can be charged; and the thing can be used to transfer liability to
the owner. [See: Lecture I, Early Forms of Liability]. Here are some quotes
from Holmes’ lecture where the learned justice sheds light on the predicament I
find myself in today:
A.
“The
early forms of legal procedure were grounded in vengeance,” Page 2.
B.
“The
liability of the owner was merely a way of getting at the slave or animal which
was the immediate cause of the offence. [Mr. Holmes cites a passage from
EXODUS, If an ox gore a man or women, that they die; then the ox shall be
surely stoned…but the owner of the ox shall be quit.”]. Page 7.
C.
“In
the primitive customs of Greece it was enforced by judicial process expressly
directed against the object animate or inanimate.” Page 7.
D.
“Learned
men have been ready to find reason in the personification of inanimate nature
common to savages and children…without such personification, anger
towards lifeless things would have been transitory at best.” Page 7.
E.
“I
now come to what I regard as the most remarkable transformation of this
principle, and one which is a most important factor in our law as it is today.
I must for the moment leave the common law and take up the doctrines of
Admiralty. In the early books…the fact of motion is averted to as of much
importance. Where a man is killed…and the thing in motion is the cause of the
death, it shall be DEODAND. The reader sees how motion gives life to the object
forfeited. Page 15.
***Note
that at law, motion itself gives life to a thing, where scientifically, life
exists only via biology.
F.
“A
manuscript of the reign of Henry VI…discloses the fact that, if a man was
killed or drowned at sea by the motion of the ship, the vessel was forfeited
to the Admiral upon a proceeding in the Admiral’s court, and subject to release
by favor of the Admiral or the King.” Page 16.
G.
“A
ship is the most living of inanimate things. Servants sometimes say ‘she’ of a
clock, but everyone gives a gender to vessels. And we need not be surprised,
therefore, to find a mode of dealing which has shown such extraordinary
vitality in the criminal law applied with even more striking thoroughness in
the Admiralty. It is only by supposing the ship to have been treated as if endowed
with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the Maritime
law can be made intelligible, and on that supposition they at once become
constant and logical.” Page 16.
H.
“By
the way of seeing what those peculiarities are, take first a case of collision
at sea. A collision takes place between two vessels, the Ticonderoga and the
Malampus, through the fault of the Ticonderoga alone. That ship is under a
lease at the time, the lessee has his own Master in charge, and the Owner of
the vessel has no manner of control over it. The Owner, therefore, is not to
blame, and he cannot even be charged on the ground that the damage was done by
his servants. He is free from personal liability on elementary principles. Yet
it is perfectly settled that there is a lien on his vessel for the
amount of the damage done, and this means that the vessel may be ARRESTED
and sold to pay the loss I any Admiralty court whose process will reach
her. If a livery-stable keeper lets a horse and wagon to a customer, who runs a
man down by careless driving, no one would think of claiming a right to seize
the horse and wagon. It would be seen that the only property which could be
sold to pay for a wrong was the property of the wrong-doer. Page 16.
I.
“At
common law one who could not impose a personal liability on the owner
could not bind a particular chattel to answer for a wrong which it had been the
instrument, but our Supreme Court has log recognized that a person may bind
a ship, when he could not bind the owners personally, because he was not
the agent.” Page 17.
J.
“This
is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding against the
vessel for an offence committed by the vessel; which is not the less an
offence, and does not the less subject her to forfeiture, because it was
committed without the authority and against the will of the owner. It is true
that inanimate matter can commit no offence. But this body is animated and put
into action by the crew, who are guided by the master. The vessel acts and
speaks by the master. [Quoting Justice Story: ‘The ting is here primarily
considered the offender, or rather the offence is primarily attached to
the thing.’]” Page 18.
K.
“Whatever
the hidden ground of policy may be their thought it still clothes itself in
personifying language.” Page 18.
L.
“By
the Maritime Law of the Middle-Ages, the ship was not only the source, but the
limit of liability. The rule already prevailed, which has been borrowed and
adopted by the English statutes and by our own act of of Congress of 1851,
according to which the owner is discharged from responsibility for wrongful
acts of a Master appointed by himself upon surrendering his interest in the
vessel and the freight which she had earned. By te doctrines of agency he would
be personally liable for the whole damage. If the origin of the system of
limited liability which is believed to be so essential to modern commerce is to
be attributed to those considerations of public policy on which it would not be
sustained, that the system has nothing to do with the law of collusion.
But the limit of liability here stands on the same ground as the NOXOE DEDITIO,
confirms the explanation, already given of the liability of the ship for wrongs
done by it while out of the owner’s hands, and conversely existence of that
liability confirms the argument here.” Page 18.
So the statutory ‘penal’ offence of (_____) would be
attached to the ‘thing.’ In the cases today via a trade name designed to fool
the sovereign people into assuming liability through familiarity (you and the
thing have names that sound alike). It seems that when we assume liability in
commerce—because the thing is in commerce—then we are in commerce also.
M.
“…Mariners
will lose their wages when the ship is lost. In like manner, in what is said by
its English editor, Sir Travers Twiss, to be the oldest part of the Consulate
of the Sea, we read that, ‘Whoever the freighter may be who runs away or dies,
the ship is bound by the contract with the sailors, much in the same way as it
was by the wrongs for which it was answerable, just as the debtor’s body was
answerable for his debts, as well as for his crimes, under the ancient law of
Rome. ‘…Also, according to our Supreme Court the Master may bind the vessel
when he cannot bind the general owners. ‘By custom the ship is bound to the
merchandise, and the merchandise to the ship.’ Page 19. ‘By the Maritime Law
every contract of the Master implies HYPOTHECATION.’ (Hypothecation is a
pledge.) Page 20.
N.
“The
principles of the Admiralty are embodied in its form of procedure. A suit
may be brought there against a vessel by name, any person interested in it
being at liberty to come in and defend, but the suit, if successful, ending in
the sale of the vessel and a payment of the Plaintiff’s claim out of the
proceeds.” Page 20.
***NOTE:
Straight from the pen of Justice Holmes;
this is the basis for my attacks on TDCJ in the Federal lawsuit as well
as the Federal Habeas Corpus; because it is the basis for their attacks on ME!!
It is supported by the exhibits, wherein I gave the state opportunities to
discuss the issues.
*** The lawsuit
emphasizes that TDCJ deprives Sovereign Men and Women of the property (in the
form of labor) without Due Process of law. This is unconstitutional at a
minimum. I am further claiming that the agency assigns a job to the Artificial
person or ‘offender’ which cannot provide labor since it has not physical
presence. The agency compels the men to provide the labor under threat of a
‘disciplinary case’ that is charged against the artificial person. Do you see
any similarities in what you just read from Oliver Wendell Holmes? The agency
then expects the human to ‘pay’ the penalty assessed against the artificial
person, because the offender has no hands, fee, or mind with which to ‘pay.’
The EXHIBITS evidence the agency admission to these points.
***The Habeas
Corpus lodged against Disciplinary Case #20140002569, is similar to the lawsuit
in that I am claiming TDCJ ‘charges’ an artificial person/offender and compels
the natural person/man (who is a third-party,
like me, to ‘pay’ the penalties assessed.
***In both
cases, TDCJ is the FIRST PARTY; the Artificial Person/Offender is the SECOND
PARTY: and the Natural Person/Human is the THIRD PARTY. This might be
Constitutional IF the 3 parties agreed to ender into the transaction as
competent parties, “knowingly” as in the nature of a valid contract or
agreement. Any contract requires competent parties, an offer, acceptance, and
consideration. The caveat to any express contract is that its elements much be
made know to all parties and evidenced in writing with all parties signing it.
No so much with implied agreements or quasi-contracts, as they are enforceable
without a ‘writing’ or endorsement. However, even tacit agreements must be
entered into knowingly, willingly and voluntarily, and the elements must
unreasonably favor one party over the other. Neither have any of us humans
KNOWIGLY contracted with the state. Considering what I have revealed so far and
adding the fact that TDCJ has agreed that humans have no REMEDY within the
agency, it appears that their acts may indeed be unconstitutional. And that is
exactly what I am claiming in the 2 current Federal Court actions
***To the extent
government agencies like TDCJ may be engaging n unconstitutional practices, as
stated; we can now proceed with a little more history herein on HOW Sovereigns,
there are only a few simple ways that may have given up (or been given up) some
of that Sovereignty [whether ‘knowingly’ or not] to any portion of government.
Most involve some sort of contract or agreement, others involve ownership or
creation, while many overlap. Many of these mechanisms are mentioned to some
extent within the popular SOVEREIGNTY/REDEMPTION literature, though not very
precisely.
28.
I
so far as Oliver W. Holmes suggests, Admiralty Courts have been historically
used to charge ‘things’ in order to transfer liability to its owner or master,
and the reader may not believe the same can be done in 21st century
America; again I invoke the authorities to make the argument for me:
RES:
Lat. A thing
IN
REM: Lat. Into or against a thing.
Both
definitions are from BARRON’s DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS, 3rd Ed.
29.
Since
we are tracking down a jurisdiction that I claim is ADMIRALTY/MARITIME; and
“every Admiralty case which touches upon jurisdiction or practice is
fundamentally a case of constitutional law, the grant of jurisdiction to the American
Admiralty Court in all such cases flows directly from the constitution and not
from any act of the legislature, and it is the exclusive prerogative of the
Supreme Court to pronounce finally upon what does or does not lie within the
ADMIRALTY and MARITIME Jurisdiction.” {{see: THE EBSWORTH MARITIME LAW LECTURE,
entitled: “The Jurisdiction and Practice of the Admiralty Court Revisited,” by
Frank L. Wiswall, Jr. J.D. PhD…at: http://www.au.edu.au/law/pub/il/lectures/the1994esworthmar.html }}. The cited
lecture references: MILES V. APEX MARINE, 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
30.
We
now turn to the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Supplemental Rules for
Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rules A-F. Therein, Supplemental Rule C suggests
“ATIONS IN REM.” Supplemental Rule B suggests, “ACTIONS I PERSONAM.” These
rules show that both ‘things’ and/or humans can be charged, which is in like
with what Justice Holmes said about the Admiralty Courts above. Note here that
while searching the same set of rules, no where but the ADMIRALTY RULES can IN
REM, Quasi-I REM, or In Personam actions be found. This is synonymous with the
statement in para. 29 by Frank Wiswall concerning this jurisdiction.
31.
For
any doubters who suggest the admiralty/maritime jurisdiction has to be ON THE
OCEAN or at least ON WATER; notice the AMERICAN JURISDICTION EXTENSION ACT
of 1948, T.46 USC 740; which gave the admiralty courts cognizance IN REM as
well as IN PERSONAM…”notwithstanding that such damages or injury be doe or
consummated on land.” [see: Maritime Law Lecture Ref. supra]. See
further: PROPELLER GENESSEE CHIEF, et al V. FITZHUGH, et al, 12 HOW. 443 (1851)
where the court stated “This power [of admiralty] is as extensive on land as on
water. The constitution makes no distinction in that respect. And if the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, which the courts of the United States may
lawfully exercise on the high seas, can be extended to the lakes under the
power to REGULATE COMMERCE, it can with the same propriety and upon the
same construction, be extended to contracts and torts on land when the
commerce is between different states, and it may embrace also the vehicles
and persons engaged in carrying it on [[thought: perhaps Natural persons
are humans who are carrying on commerce!!!]]…No the judicial power in cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction has never been supposed to extend to
contract made on land and to be executed on land. But if the power to regulate
commerce can be made the foundation of jurisdiction beyond its heretofore known
and admitted limits, may be created on water under that authority, the same
reason would justify the same exercise of power on land.”
32.
*We
have seen that in Admiralty Jurisdiction, things or property can be sued or
‘charged’ in order to establish liability against the owner; and all of these
transactions can take place on land.
33.
*The
Sovereign people cannot be ‘named’ in statutes as ‘person’ (which indicates an
artificial person/commercial entity, or perhaps a natural person that engages
in commerce); yet we find people going to prison under penal codes which only
reference the term ‘person as committing ‘offences.’ None of the humans in
prison now were ‘named’ by any statute.
34.
This
is puzzling because BLACK’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., defines a
“PENAL ACTION” as a ‘Civil Action’ in which a wrongdoer is subject to a fine or
penalty payable to the aggrieved party. The word ‘penal’ is inherently a much
broader term than ‘criminal’ since it pertains to any punishment or penalty and
relates to acts which are not necessarily delineated as ‘criminal.’ Action is
essentially ‘penal’ if amount sought to be recovered is arbitrarily exacted for
some act or omission of the defendant.” *Note here that while penalties for
code offences in Texas prescribe a guideline such as: 2 to 10 years; 2 to 20
years; 5 to 99 years, etc., and fines in up to various amounts; the actual
judgments in specific cases are all over the map. This would indicate the
‘amount sought’ is arbitrarily exacted.
35.
Bet
you can’t guess which jurisdiction is “Civil” but has penalties for violation
of its provision? Could it be ADMIRALTY? BOVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (1856) defines
ADIRALTY as: “The name of a jurisdiction which takes cognizance of suits
or actions which arise in consequence of acts done upon or relating to the sea;
or in other words, of all transactions and proceedings relative to commerce and
navigation, and to damages or injuries upon the sea.”
36.
From
the LEX MERCATORIA, 6th Ed., (1795) “An historical deduction of
Trade and Commerce, from their origins,” we have this quote: “Commerce is that
intercourse with foreign nations, which is carried on from one country to
another by means of navigation; either for the exchange of commodities, or for
the sale or purchase of them, through the medium of money. Commerce then, has
its basis in navigation, and is supported by exports and imports, whereas
simple trade may be transacted independent of these elements and commerce, and herein
chiefly consists the difference.” Also on page 356 of that work: “Navigation,
is the art of sailing at sea, also the manner of trading; and a
navigator is one who understands navigation, or imports goods in foreign
bottoms.” (Bottoms, indicates the bottom of a ship).
37.
Don’t
worry, I am confused too. It would seem in order for a so-called crim or
offence listed in any ‘penal code,’ to be synonymous with the admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, it would have be be synonymous to commerce also. Here’s
what TITLE 27 of the CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, PART 72.11 says about
COMMERCIAL CRIMES: “Includes any of the following types of crimes: offenses
against the revenue laws, burglary, counterfeiting; forgery, kidnapping,
larceny, robbery, illegal sale or possession of deadly weapons, prostitution,
extortion, swindling and confidence games, and attempting to commit, conspiring
to commit, or compounding any of the foregoing crimes. Addition to narcotic
drugs and the use of marijuana will be treated as if such were a commercial
crime. *Note: sounds funny doesn’t it that possession of weapons or addiction
to drugs would have anything at all to do with commercial crime. It would seem
that the powers-that-be would really have to ssttrreettcchh to find a reason to
make those things “commercial!!” And what would be the reason the
powers-that-be would have to resort to such a stretch to begin with?
38.
See
also: TITLE 27 CFR 72.11, “Meaning of Terms,” “The terms ‘includes’ and
‘including’ do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general
class.” *Note: this meaning of terms seems to be in line with the EJUSDEM
GENERIS/NOSCITUR A SOCIIS rules of statutory construction, and also suggests
that: (1) Since most of the crimes listed in paragraph 37 also appear in certain
‘penal codes,’ then the entire class of penal offences are included. (2) the
“Part” cited does not distinguish between city, state, or federal crimes;
therefore, essentially all jurisdictional venues are included. [This idea is
supported where several authorities suggest that any state is a unit,
instrumentality, or territory of the Federal authorities. See: DYETT S. TURNER,
439 P.2d 266, 267; 49 STAT. 647; 28 USC 3002].
39.
“in
this country revenue cases have so long been the subject of ADMIRALTY
cognizance that congress considered them as CIVIL cases of ADMIRALTY and
MARITIME Jurisdiction.” THE HUTRSS, 12 FED. CASE, 984 at 992 (case no. 6, 914,
D. Me 1840). *Note: Remember the “class” commercial crimes enumerated in
paragraph 37 above, include REVENUE cases. They are ALL Civil, an they all have
penalties attached to them, whether fines and/or prison.
40.
“The
authorization to SEIZE comes from Admiralty rules of the Federal Civil Procedure.”
UNITED STATES VS. $3,976.62 in currency, one of 1960 FORD Stn. Wagon, 37 F.R.D.
564. *Note: here that in this case, a set of things were ‘charged,’
namely, currency and a car. How the things defend themselves? Well, they
cannot, the owner must do it.
41.
CHAPTER
59 of the TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, allow for “IN REM CIVIL
FORFEITURES,” which “are neither punishment nor criminal.” FAANT VS. STATE, 941
S.W.2d 914 (TX.CR.APP.1996). *Note: f in Rem Civil Forfeitures are neither
punishment nor criminal, they why is it that I Texas, forfeitures are conducted
according to the rules of “CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?” I THINK IT IS TELLING THAT THE
CODE CITED ABOVE SUGGESTS CIVIL FORFEITURES ARE “in rem.” And where is the only
jurisdictions that allows IN REM ACTIONS? [See para. 30 above]. That could be
ADMIRALTY and we’ll include MARITIME since “The terms admiralty and maritime
are virtually synonymous.” BLACK’s, 6th Ed.
42.
**So
now we come to the part where we put this together in regards to my own Federal
Court cases. Case No 2:13 CV 217 is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus where
I have filed against TDCJ for a Disciplinary case that I suggest was tried
against an artificial person, yet the human (me) who I think is a third-party,
has been made the one that actually pays the penalty. The bottom line here is
that I am making the connection to the admiralty jurisdiction, however that has
come about. I can’t put my finger on it, but I have many documents where I have
requested pointed information from the powers-that-be and they have not
responded or have avoided the issue completely, which leaves room for question.
The questions remain and I have petitioned the court for an answer. Right now,
I am fighting for the Supreme Court to answer the question of Admiralty in the
Habeas Corpus case. If they say yes, then a whole new set of questions arise,
such as: “Since the nature of the Admiralty is commerce and contract, then
where is the contract that binds me to that jurisdiction?” If TDCJ cannot
produce a contract, a commercial contract, then perhaps the admiralty
jurisdiction has attached up the line somewhere; I mean, I had to go through a
certain set of circumstances just to get to TDCJ right?
43.
**Case
No 2:13 CV 230 is a civil suit where I am asking for certification as a “class”
of Plaintiff who are people in prison as third-parties to a debt. That debt is
against a artificial person with an ALL CAPITAL letter names that sounds like
the family name of the human people living here. Like the above case, since it
appears the state has charged things IN REM, the ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME
JURISDICTION would apply in this case also. Though the Federal District Court
in Amarillo has dismissed the case, I have asked for certification to the
Supreme Court of the question of Admiralty Jurisdiction. Again, how can TDCJ
‘assign’ a ‘job’ to an artificial person and coerce a third-party human to do
the work if it is not the admiralty? Time will tell.
