"Just Contradiction"

     For those who may wonder what a post about Texas Just-ice has to do with the stated paradigm of Ali3nizm…I would direct your attention to the following:
     1. That philosophically, Ali3nizm is a common forum for individuals who feel they have been “alienated” by another group, culture, gender, etc. and the justice system chews up and digests Ali3nz by the thousands.
     2. Though criminal systems aren’t the only repositories of underdogs, given my own experience, it should be fairly easy to expose inherent flaws in a system by investigating the multitudinous contradictions therein and ho they apply to the disenfranchised masses.
     That’s exactly what you will find in the Texas “justice” system. Many of us who are subject to the U.S./Texas system of justice wonder how each branch of government can say one thing and do the complete opposite. Not long ago I asked myself that very question and decided to examine the very document which officials claim gives them authority over the individual.
     Within the subject context is the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which states: “In all criminal cases, the accused shall be informed…of the nature and charge of the accusation against him.” For the life of me, I have not found the official definition of the Sixth Amendment term “nature” in any court opinion or statute in my unit la library. Perhaps there is no definition.
     Prison officials claim that our institutional law library is sufficient for the body of inmates in general, yet we are barred from reading cases older than 20 odd years. When one considers that many older cases may be important due to the principles addressed in the prevailing court opinion—the barring of access to them, displays an arbitrary contradiction that epitomizes unfairness. Her is the short version of almost infinite contradictions one may encounter in the justice system:
     Just contradictory examples…

Of the Law itself:
     A. Inmate litigators experience the too frequent practice of judges ho simply ignore the proper filing of Pro Se pleadings, despite the fact those actions are a duty. It seems necessary in the majority of cases, for Pro Se litigants to resort to applications for mandamus with a higher court in an attempt to force a lower court to perform the duties they should be doing anyway. Why do we pay taxes for justices who do not perform their jobs?
     B. I have heard so many stories about incompetent or outright crooked lawyers that it makes my head hurt. The most common complaint is the attorney promise to a defendant that if he takes a “plea” the sentence ill be shorter, or he will make parole after “X” number of years. Invariably, the judge will choose a sentence over that agreed upon, or there will be no true parole consideration by the parole board. For defendants who pay out-of-pocket for their legal counsel, a retainer will generally grow into a series of supplemental payments for “additional” or “unforeseen” services beyond the original agreement. (Some advice: Demand from the attorney in writing, an agreement that outlines specific performance, prior to any payment.)

Of Parole issues:
     C. A type of parole in which an offenders’ “Good Time”, “Work Time” and “Flat Time” equaled 100% of his sentence that used to be called “Mandatory Supervision,” and would indicate the automatic release of an inmate unless time was deducted due to a disciplinary action. That type of release is no called “Discretionary/Mandatory Supervision.” In practice, no matter how much total “time” is accrued, it appears the release is routinely denied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
   
     Luckily some of us convicted Ali3nz have loved ones “outside” with internet access who are sometimes willing to copy precidential cases in order to snail mail them to Pro Se jailhouse litigators. So, without help from the state, I combed through some older cases looking for the word, “Nature,” hoping against hope to discover the definition of the term as it relates to the Sixth Amendment (so I may comprehend the predicament I’m in.) The Supreme Court opinion of Faretta vs. California, 95 Sct.2525, indicates the “Nature” has something to do with “Ground Rules,” yet to learn the ground rules, it takes the experience of an “attorney who has tried a lot of cases.” A different opinion from the highest court actually distinguishes between the “Nature”, “Statutory Offenses”, “Punishment”, “Defenses”, and “Facts”. Schneckloth vs. Bustamonte, 93 Sct. 2041 (1973).
     At arraignment, is seems that judges routinely ask criminal defendants’ the statutorily correct question of whether the accused “Understands the Charge.” The case of Henderson vs. Morgan, 96 Sct. 2253 (1976), suggests that either “nature” OR “understanding” (understood) are necessary for a plea to be “voluntary.” Rarely it seems, does a judge mutter the word “Nature.” How iis it that the Sixth Amendment mandates that a defendant will be informed of the nature, but judges are asking defendants to agree (An understanding can be an agreement of sorts) to waive his rights without first a reference to the nature (or essence, which is the Webster’s definition of the term) of the accusation?
     One may contemplate, what on Earth is the nature of a charge in which the very essence is based on contradiction? Many would-be defendants may not care to kno the answer until it’s too late, and they might ask, “Why do I need to know the nature of the charge anyway?”
     The founding fathers thought that knowing the Nature of the Accusation to be important enough for it to be enumerated in the Constitution as a mandate. That alone leads me to believe the “Nature” is not only necessary information, but the statutes which allow a judge to side-step the duty—may be, unconstitutional!
Since the statutes are silent on what constitutes the nature of an accusation, then perhaps the nature in non-statutory. I’ve already stated that I couldn’t find the definition cited in court opinions, yet where the statutes are silent, “Then the judiciary sets the limits.” James vs. United States, 366 US 213, at 200 (1961). With no other choice, I began to analyze the U.S. Constitution itself. In doing so I thought, if dictionaries suggest the nature is the “essence” of something, then it seems the Constitution grants certain types of courts to operate as colored arms of the legislature in Article I, or as an independent branch of government as in Article III.
Realizing this, if I were to be “arraigned” in court today, I would certainly inquire with the judge whether he is operating as an Article I or and Article III court. I know someone who asked a municipal judge this very thing in a misdemeanor traffic case. The jurist said his “power” came from the U.S. Constitution at Article III.
Naturally, I was next drawn to examine Article III, searching form some clue to the nature of my criminal accusation. It didn’t take long for me to realize that any power of any court in the nation must originate from one of four jurisdictions: (common) law, equity, admiralty, or maritime. Isn’t it essential then, to know the jurisdiction which the court uses to officiate, as one part of defining what the nature consists of? Each of those jurisdictions has its own principles which make it unique, different from the others. Otherwise, why would they be listed as separate? Woe to the litigant, who is unaware of the name of the power a judge has over him. Elementary logic.
     Back to my acquaintance in the traffic case. Firmly established by the judge was that the case was “criminal,” otherwise the defendant could not be jailed for a failure to pay the fine. That ruled out equity jurisdiction. His honor indicated his jurisdiction was not based on the common law either. That left only Admiralty or Maritime, which the court said was not granting his power either. Another contradiction, because those are the only Article III jurisdictions the court has license to operate in.
     The traffic court guy inquired with his judge as to what is the NAME of the seeming unauthorized jurisdiction. The court replied “Statutory.” Pressed further, the judge said, “The laws of the state of Texas,” then, “Legislative enactment,” and so on. The case ended in a stalemate wherein the judge assessed a fine anyway, but invited an appeal to the next higher court.
     What’s wrong with this picture? I mean, what is the “Nature” of a charge that, on its face is so contradictory that no judge will name the judicial power that precipitates it? Logic dictates that, even if we are somehow contractually bound to a given piece of legislation, the court must still hear the case based on the principles of one of the four judicial powers we’ve mentioned. Setting aside the issue of “powers” for a moment, I decided on a whim, to explore the topic of agreements as a possible method of waiving constitutional rights. Research indicated that statutory definitions synonymous with some of my points of contention, are to be found within the U.C.C. (Uniform Commercial Code). As I investigated the U.C.C., in my mind, certain sections began to congeal into a logical paradigm which indicated to me that possibly there were a lot of constitutional protections that may have been inadvertently waived due to my unknowing participation in one or more implied agreements with the State.
     One may ask the question, “How is it that the U.C.C. apples to the justice system, unless we are somehow subject to a commercial contract, right?” As it happens, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) is a corporate entity under license of the State and the United States. TDCJ is in the business of warehousing persons or humans for the purpose of creating/maintaining a valuable workforce, where one class of resident workers receives valid compensation of Federal Reserve Notes—in contrast with another class of resident workers that do not receive valid consideration for their labor. The Corporation of TDCJ utilizes the workforce labor to produce marketable goods for sale to other corporate entities. The value for the sale or exchange of products is calculated in dollar amounts of Federal Reserve Notes.
Resident inmates who are housed on property owned/leased by the corporate entity called TDCJ, are by their very existence, engaging in the support of the commerce which TDCJ prosecutes with other businesses, so the inmate has no choice in the matter.
     TDCJ and its agents are contractually obligated by law, to provide for the care and custody of its’ inmate residents—regardless of any implied consideration on the part of the inmate(s). In other words, the corporation must provide for the health and welfare of all inmates no matter whether the inmate chooses to follow any rules, work, or otherwise cooperate with the corporation. This includes personal property/inmate labor. Inmates have been sentenced by a court to a term of confinement (time) only and not labor. Even if a court were to sentence a defendant to death, prior to his execution, and by law he has a right to life in the form of food, water, air, clothing and hygiene.
     In Texas, it is the duty of those officials of TDCJ to provide those necessities no matter the conduct or other desired cooperation by the individual inmate. During the course of day to day commerce with TDCJ, the population of inmates can choose whether to cooperate with institutional rules in good faith, for consideration termed, “Good Conduct Time Credits.” The credits could qualify as valid consideration to the commercial contract between TDCJ and the inmate(s), if the credits represented true negotiable property value in the mind of inmate(s). However, Vernon’s Texas Government Code, Ann 498.003, provides that Good Conduct Time Credits are good only for early parole eligibility or Mandatory Release, yet the following points serve to remove any concept of value from the credits:

1. The inmate convicted of an aggravated sentence has no prospect for Discretionary/Mandatory Supervision, nor do his combined credits provide early parole qualification because he must serve 50% of his sentence before the parole board will review his case. In addition, it appears the common practice is for the parole board to require an inmate to serve 85% to 100% of his sentence “flat” irregardless of his positive institutional performance.
2. One may conclude that all Texas inmates are denied a valid parole review because the average review in absentia takes only 3 to 7 minutes. How can anyone review a file that is likely “inches” thick in such a short time span? If no valid parole consideration is available, the value of the combined “Time Credits” falls to zero, or less.
3. Should an inmate actually experience a parole miracle—prior to his actual release he would be compelled to sign an agreement that effectively trades all accrued “Time Credits” for however many months of parole it will take to discharge his sentence. The problem here is, as a negotiable instrument, the unequal rate of exchange to months on parole is never uniform from one parolee to the next, which is against the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.
4. Although the above relates to what is termed “Work Time Credits,” or inmate time sheets, it appears the code (498.003(e)) considers the two types of “Time Credits” the same as to the stated criteria for “accrual.” In any case, the state contractually awards the time credits to inmates in exchange for their “volunteer” labor or other participation, unless the inmate is mentally or physically incapable of participating.
5. Which brings us to another point of inequity. Is it fair to award the same amount of credits to inmates of a given class when some of those inmates work full time, part time, or not at all? This unfair practice would indicate that sub-classes of inmates exist in this aspect which may go against the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
6. Should any Texas inmate fail to “volunteer” to participate in a work or education program, then he is subject to arbitrary administrative disciplinary action, which can further limit institutional liberty, as well as negatively affect his classification status.
7. Regarding the above points, the inmate’s labor has true value as personal property, but more importantly, is the value in return for consideration in support of a simple contract (U.C.C. 1.204). As stated above, the Good Conduct Time Credits have absolutely no value whatsoever to the average inmate and by extension, the quasi-contract between the state and the inmate.

     The fact remains that inmates are coerced into performance of the implied quasi-contract under threat of disciplinary action, without viable remedy or recourse. These facts evidence the “lack of meaningful choice,” and combined with “contractual terms that unreasonably favor” the state, together, meet the “objective standard” that proves the existence of an unconscionable contract. Unconscionable contracts are void and unenforceable.
     The Texas statutes which authorize TDCJ to engage in what appears to be void contracts of a commercial nature, suggests the business practices of TDCJ are impairing the obligation of contracts in violation of the U.S. Constitution Article I Section 10.
     We’ll explore that possibility in a future post. Until then, don’t sign anything!